Conflict Archive · Research Essay
Nagorno-Karabakh: The 2020 War, the 2023 Offensive, and the End of De Facto Armenian Rule
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict moved from the 2020 war to Azerbaijan’s September 2023 offensive, after which more than 100,000 ethnic Armenians fled to Armenia.
Nagorno-Karabakh: The 2020 War, the 2023 Offensive, and the End of De Facto Armenian Rule
Nagorno-Karabakh is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, but for decades the region was governed by a de facto Armenian-backed administration and inhabited predominantly by ethnic Armenians. The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan combined competing national claims, the legacy of the Soviet Union’s dissolution, displacement from earlier wars, and a security order that never produced a lasting political settlement. Two major turning points were the 44-day war in 2020 and Azerbaijan’s military operation in September 2023.
The conflict is not a single uninterrupted battle. The 2020 war, the post-war ceasefire period, the crisis around the Lachin Corridor, and the 2023 offensive have distinct actors, objectives and consequences. They belong in one connected history but should be separately dated and described.
A long-running territorial dispute
The dispute intensified as the Soviet Union dissolved. War in the early 1990s left Armenian forces and the de facto authorities in control of Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding Azerbaijani districts. Large populations of ethnic Azerbaijanis were displaced from territories captured by Armenian forces, while ethnic Armenians had also been displaced from other areas during the wider conflict. The ceasefire froze the front without settling sovereignty or creating conditions for the safe return of all displaced people.
International negotiations continued for years but failed to resolve the core questions of territorial control, security guarantees, self-determination claims and return. The status quo was armed rather than peaceful: both states expanded military capabilities, and periodic clashes killed soldiers and civilians. The European Parliament’s research service describes the conflict as one of the longest-running disputes in the post-Soviet space and notes the renewed violence in 2020 and 2022.
The 2020 war
On 27 September 2020, large-scale fighting erupted along the line of contact. Azerbaijan’s forces advanced using artillery, drones, precision strikes and ground manoeuvres, while Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh forces defended positions and counterattacked. The fighting lasted 44 days and caused significant military and civilian casualties. Towns and villages came under bombardment, and civilians fled from the combat zone.
Azerbaijan regained control over substantial territory around and within the former conflict zone, including areas lost in the early 1990s. The capture of Shusha/Shushi was a major turning point. A Russia-brokered statement announced a ceasefire effective 10 November 2020. It provided for the return of several districts to Azerbaijan, the deployment of Russian peacekeepers and the establishment of a route connecting Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh through the Lachin Corridor.
The ceasefire changed the territorial balance but did not settle the status of Nagorno-Karabakh or the future of its Armenian population. Disputes over border demarcation, prisoners, missing persons, mine maps and transport links continued. The presence of Russian peacekeepers became a central element of the post-war security arrangement, but their presence could not substitute for a political settlement accepted by both societies.
The Lachin Corridor and the 2023 crisis
The Lachin Corridor was the principal road linking Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. Its security and accessibility became crucial for food, medicine, fuel, movement and family contact. Restrictions and disruption to movement raised humanitarian concerns. In February 2023, the International Court of Justice ordered Azerbaijan, pending the final decision in the relevant proceedings, to take measures at its disposal to ensure unimpeded movement of persons, vehicles and cargo along the corridor in both directions. The Court’s order was a provisional measure and did not decide the entire dispute on its merits.
On 19 September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh. After approximately a day of fighting, the de facto authorities agreed to a ceasefire and disarmament arrangements. Azerbaijan regained full control over the region. Within days, more than 100,000 ethnic Armenians left for Armenia, an exodus that transformed the demographic reality of Nagorno-Karabakh and created an urgent humanitarian and housing challenge for Armenia.
The International Court of Justice’s order of 17 November 2023 recorded the scale of displacement and indicated provisional measures requiring Azerbaijan to ensure safe, unimpeded and expeditious return for those who wished to return, safe departure for those wishing to leave, and freedom from force or intimidation for those wishing to remain. These measures addressed urgent rights at risk; they were not a final judgment on every contested factual or legal issue.
Civilian protection and displacement
The conflict has repeatedly displaced civilians. In the 2020 war, families fled bombardment and ground fighting. The 2023 exodus was different in character and scale: the collapse of the de facto authorities and the new security environment led virtually the entire ethnic Armenian population to leave. UNHCR reported that more than 100,000 refugees arrived in Armenia in about a week, including many children and older people. Immediate needs included shelter, healthcare, documentation, education, livelihoods and long-term housing.
Displacement figures should be linked to the event and population counted. Refugees from the 2023 exodus should not be merged without explanation with people displaced in the 1990s or 2020. Nor should the movement of people be treated as proof of a single legal conclusion without considering the evidence and relevant legal standards. The right to return, protection from coercion, preservation of identity and property documents, and the safety of remaining residents are separate but connected questions.
Civilian harm during active fighting also requires careful accounting. Casualty reports from governments and parties may use different definitions, and access to the region has often been limited. Independent verification and dated sources are essential, especially when claims concern alleged attacks on civilians or violations of international humanitarian law.
A changed regional balance
The 2020 and 2023 turning points changed the military balance in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan consolidated territorial control; Armenia faced the consequences of defeat, displacement and questions about its security arrangements. Russia’s role as mediator and peacekeeping provider became more contested, while the European Union expanded its diplomatic engagement and deployed a civilian monitoring mission in Armenia in 2023 to observe security developments along the Armenia–Azerbaijan border.
The conflict’s future cannot be reduced to the question of who controls a map. A durable settlement would need to address border delimitation, transport routes, security, detainees and missing people, property and cultural heritage, the rights of displaced persons, and the conditions under which any return could be voluntary and safe. These issues are linked, but progress on one does not automatically resolve the others.
How the archive classifies the conflict
This entry covers the connected Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, with separate phases for the 2020 war and the September 2023 offensive. The Armenia–Azerbaijan border clashes outside Nagorno-Karabakh are tracked separately because they occurred in internationally recognized Armenian territory and involved a different geography and set of military objectives. The broader dispute, state-based fighting and one-sided violence should not be counted as interchangeable categories.
A complete event-level audit remains necessary. The archive should compare dated incidents with UCDP records and reliable human-rights documentation, record competing claims without treating them as equally substantiated by default, and distinguish provisional court measures from final legal determinations.
Sources and further reading
- European Parliament Research Service, Armenia and Azerbaijan: Between war and peace.
- International Court of Justice, Order of 22 February 2023 on the Lachin Corridor.
- International Court of Justice, Order of 17 November 2023 concerning persons displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh.
- UNHCR Armenia, refugee response and coordination.